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Abstract
We examine how a downstream merger affects input prices and, in turn, the
profitability of a such a merger under Cournot competition with differentiated
products. Input suppliers can be interpreted as ordinary upstream firms, or
trade unions organising workers. If the input suppliers are plant-specific, we
find that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model with
exogenous input prices. In contrast to the received literature, we find that it
can be more profitable to take part in a merger than being an outsider. For
firm-specific input suppliers, on the other hand, results are reversed. We
apply our model to endogenous merger formation in an international
oligopoly, and show that the equilibrium market structure is likely to be
characterised by cross-border merger.
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lars.sorgard@nhh.no1I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is often claimed that downstream mergers aﬀect not only output
prices, but also input prices. For example, empirical literature sug-
gests that mergers may aﬀect wages, one of the most important inputs
to production (see e.g. Peoples et al., 1993, and McGuckin et al., 1995).
D e s p i t et h i se v i d e n c e ,t h et h e o r e t i c a ll i t e r a t u r eo nm e r g e r sd o e sn o ti n -
vestigate any possible links between mergers and wages or input prices
more in general.1 It is mainly concerned with how a merger aﬀects the
rivalry between ﬁrms in the downstream market. The purpose of this
paper is to help ﬁlling this gap by analysing mergers in a setting with
oligopolistic input suppliers.
It is not clear-cut how a downstream merger aﬀects the input sup-
plier structure. In some instances it may lead to a merger between the
merging ﬁrms’ input suppliers as well. For example, the two merging
downstream ﬁrms’ trade unions may merge into one trade union after
the merger. We characterise this as ﬁrm-speciﬁc input suppliers. In
other instances the input suppliers are plant-speciﬁc and thereby do not
merge as a response to the downstream merger. This could be the case if
the upstream ﬁrms are traditional input suppliers of other factors than
labour, or if the downstream merger is a cross-border merger and each
trade union continues as a trade union for a plant in each country. We
show that the input supply structure - whether input suppliers are plant-
or ﬁrm-speciﬁc - is decisive for the input price responses, and thus the
proﬁtability, of a downstream merger.
In a seminal paper, Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) show that
in a Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous goods, linear demand and
constant marginal costs, a merger is unproﬁtable unless the merging
coalition consists of more than 80 per cent of all ﬁrms in the indus-
try. More recent studies have shown how a relaxation of some of the
1There are a few notable exceptions. González-Maestre and López-Cuñat (2001)
analyse merger in a homogeneous Cournot model where each owner delegates output
decisions to a manager. The manager’s incentive scheme, which is endogenous in the
model and thereby aﬀected by a merger, can be regarded as an input price. Since
the incentive scheme is set by the owner, their setting is distinctly diﬀerent from ours
where we have independent input suppliers that set input prices. In Bárcena-Ruiz
and Garzón (2000) a merger aﬀects wage setting. However, they analyse a merger
from duopoly to monopoly. Horn and Wolinsky (1988a) apply a bargaining model to
analyse a merger from duopoly to monopoly, either upstream (unions) or downstream
(ﬁrms) merger. Our approach is diﬀerent in several ways, though. Horn and Wolinsky
consider downstream merger only in the case of a single upstream input supplier. For
our purposes, this turns out to be the least interesting case. Furthermore, since we
are concerned about the well known free rider problem in the merger literature, we
apply a model which includes a non-merging ﬁrm.
2assumptions in Salant et al. (1983) may restore the perhaps more in-
t u i t i v er e s u l tt h a tm e r g e r sa r em o s to f t e np r o ﬁtable. Predictions from
t h e o r ya r et h a tam e r g e rw i t h o u ta n yc o s ts a v i n g si st y p i c a l l yp r o ﬁtable
under Bertrand competition, and typically unproﬁtable under Cournot
competition unless products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated.2
More clear-cut is the theory’s prediction concerning the insiders’ ver-
sus the outsiders’ gain from a merger. As far as we know, no studies
ﬁnd that it is more proﬁt a b l et ob eo n eo ft h em e r g i n gﬁrms than to
be one of the non-merging ﬁrms unless there are some exogenous cost
savings following a merger.3 One could then argue that each ﬁrm should
wait, hoping that other ﬁr m sm e r g ea n dt h e nb eaf r e er i d e ro ns u c ha
merger.4
O u rm o d e li si nm u c ht h es a m es p i r i ta sS a l a n tet al. (1983). We
apply a Cournot model of diﬀerentiated products.5 The results in the
literature are reproduced in a benchmark version of our model, where
the ﬁrms’ input prices - which can be wages or prices on other input
f a c t o r s-a r ee x o g e n o u s .
In the model, there is only one input to production and it is supplied
by an independent input supplier.6 As is common in models of vertical
relations, we assume that the upstream input suppliers set prices prior to
the Cournot subgame in the downstream market. If the input supplier
is an ordinary ﬁrm, it maximises proﬁts. However, the input supplier
might instead be a trade union that is concerned about both wages and
employment. Proﬁt maximisation by a ﬁrm would be analogous to rent
maximisation by a trade union, one particular kind of trade-oﬀ between
wages and employment. We choose a maximisation problem for the input
supplier that includes a parameter capturing the trade-oﬀ between wages
2Concerning product diﬀerentiation, see Deneckere and Davidson (1985) and Lom-
merud and Sørgard (1997); concerning the cost side, see Perry and Porter (1985) and
McAfee and Williams (1992); concerning the nature of competition, see Deneckere
and Davidson (1985).
3A referee has drawn our attention to Creane and Davidson (2000). In this paper,
am e r g e dﬁrm retains the original ﬁrms as divisions with some autonomy. The
headquarter can stage a Stackelberg quantity setting game among the divisions, and
this can lead to proﬁtable mergers with insiders beneﬁtting more than outsiders. A
quite parallel research eﬀort is Huck, Konrad and Müller (2001).
4This free rider problem was ﬁrst pointed out in Stigler (1950). Fridolfsson and
Stennek (2000) show that this mechanism may delay a merger rather than prevent
it completely.
5It can be shown that our results are valid also for the case of Bertrand competition
and diﬀerentiated products, see Lommerud, Straume and Sørgard (2000).
6In Farrell and Shapiro (1990a, 1990b) and Perry and Porter (1985) there are also
cost eﬀects of a merger. While in our model the cost eﬀect is due to changes in input
prices, the cost eﬀects in their models are due to internal costs savings.
3and employment, which implies that a proﬁt maximising input supplier
can be treated as a special case.7 It should be noted that the case of
a trade union that emphasise employment considerations, is parallel to
the case of a non-proﬁt-maximising ﬁrm that puts much weight on sales.
We distinguish between three diﬀe r e n tw a y st oo r g a n i s et h es u p p l y
of input: the input suppliers can either be plant-speciﬁc, ﬁrm-speciﬁco r
industry-speciﬁc .I nt h el a t t e rc a s ea l lt h ei n p u ts u p p l i e r si nt h ei n d u s t r y
are organised in a single ﬁrm, which in the case of trade unions can be
interpreted as one trade union for the entire industry. The single input
supplier is then not only a monopolist in the input market, but a back-
seat monopolist in the product market as well. A merger is irrelevant
for upstream price setting in such a context, because what matters is
the elasticity of product market demand, which is not aﬀected by a
downstream merger. The results from the standard literature still apply.
Our main focus is on the case of plant-speciﬁc input suppliers, which
dramatically changes the results from the benchmark model. A plant-
speciﬁc input supplier delivers its input to one plant only. In this case a
merger between two ﬁr m sd o e sn o tc h a n g et h en u m b e ro fi n p u ts u p p l i e r s ,
but it changes the rivalry between them. The two merged ﬁrms’ input
suppliers compete more ﬁercely on input prices to serve the merged ﬁrm.
We ﬁnd that, in contrast to the standard literature, a merger is now
proﬁtable. The exception is the case where the input supplier is a trade
union with strong preferences for employment. A highly employment-
oriented union would imply that wages are close to the competitive level
initially, so that a merger has only a limited eﬀect on wages.
We show that the merging ﬁrm’s input prices are always lower than
the non-merging ﬁrms’ input prices. Due to this a merger can be more
proﬁtable for a merging than for a non-merging ﬁrm. The exception
is, again, the case where the input suppliers are trade unions with a
suﬃciently strong emphasis on employment. In such a case the merger
has only limited eﬀects on wages, and the traditional result about merger
in Cournot oligopoly applies.
If the input suppliers are ﬁrm- rather than plant-speciﬁc, our re-
sults are reversed. In the case of ﬁrm-speciﬁc input suppliers, a merger
between two ﬁrms implies that the merging ﬁrms’ input suppliers also
merge. One natural interpretation would be that the input suppliers are
trade unions within a country, and the trade unions merge when the
ﬁrms merge so there is only one trade union per ﬁr m .W et h e nh a v ea
7By letting the input supplier set prices, we have de facto applied a monopoly
union model in the cases where the input suppliers are trade unions. It can be shown
that our results are valid also in a setting with an eﬃcient bargaining model rather
than a monopoly union, see Lommerud, Straume and Sørgard (2000).
4higher concentration in the input market, which reduces the rivalry be-
tween the input suppliers. In this case a merger results in higher input
prices, and more so for the merging ﬁrms than for the non-merging ﬁrm.
Not surprisingly then, a merger is now less proﬁtable than in the case
with exogenous input prices. In this case a merger is unproﬁtable under
Cournot competition unless t h ep r o d u c t sa r eh i g h l yd i ﬀerentiated and
the input suppliers are trade unions with an extremely strong emphasis
o ne m p l o y m e n t .S i n c ei n p u tp r i c e si n c r e a s em o r ef o rt h em e r g i n gt h a n
the non-merging ﬁrms, an outsider earns more from a merger than a
participant. Thus, the traditional result in the literature is restored in
this respect.
We also apply our model to endogenous merger formation. A ﬁrm can
merge with either another domestic ﬁrm or a foreign ﬁrm. Given that the
input suppliers are trade unions, we argue that a domestic downstream
merger may lead to union merger as well, whereas a merger between
a domestic and a foreign ﬁrm would not lead to such a union merger.
By applying the approach introduced in Horn and Persson (2001) we
show that, for a large set of parameter values, the equilibrium market
structure is cross-border merger. The reason is that such a merger would
reduce rents among the input suppliers, while a domestic merger would
have the opposite eﬀect.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we present the
model, with a benchmark for comparison. In Section 3 we investigate
downstream merger with plant-speciﬁc input suppliers, while we in Sec-
tion 4 analyse how our results change if we have either ﬁrm-speciﬁco r
industry speciﬁc input suppliers. In Section 5 we apply the model to en-
dogenous merger formation, and in Section 6 we discuss some extension
of our model. We oﬀer some concluding remarks in Section 7.
2 Some preliminaries
Consider an oligopoly industry that consists of three ﬁrms, each produc-
ing one brand of a diﬀerentiated product. Let ﬁrm i produce brand i
in quantity qi. There is no entry or threat of entry, and ﬁrms compete
in a Cournot fashion. For the moment we assume that ﬁrms 1 and 2
are the merger candidates. Later on, we allow for endogenous merger
formation. We assume that the merged ﬁrm continues to produce two
brands (1 and 2), making it ’larger’ than either of the pre-merger ﬁrms.
The outsider (ﬁrm 3) continues to produce one brand (3). Let us here
ﬁrst show the results found in a benchmark model with exogenous input
prices, and then introduce endogenous input prices.
5Ab e n c h m a r k
Demand for the diﬀerentiated product is characterised by a symmet-
r i cd e m a n ds y s t e m ,w h e r et h ei n v e r s ed e m a n df u n c t i o nf o rb r a n d1i s
given by
p1 =1− q1 − b(q2 + q3) (1)
with a corresponding structure for the inverse demand functions for the
other brands. The parameter b ∈ h0,1i is a measure of substitutability
in demand. If b → 0 the brands are regarded as (almost) unrelated,
whereas b → 1 corresponds to the case of (almost) homogeneous goods.
There is only one factor of production, and one unit of input is sup-
plied to the downstream ﬁrm at a price w. We assume that the input
supply from diﬀerent input suppliers is homogeneous and that diﬀerent
brands are produced by using the same production technology, so that
the only factors that ties a certain brand to a ﬁr ma r ep a t e n tr i g h t so r
sunk marketing investments.
We adopt a very simple linear production function, given by
qi = li (2)
where qi is total quantity produced (of brand i)b yﬁrm i,a n dli is the
total amount of input employed by ﬁrm i. In this case, output and input
are equivalent.
As a benchmark for later comparison, consider the following result:
Lemma 1. If input prices are exogenous and equal across ﬁrms, a
downstream merger is proﬁtable if b<0.55, and more proﬁtable for the
outsider than for a participant.
Proof. Results follow directly from Lommerud and Sørgard (1997).
¥
An outsider’s best response to a reduction in sales by the merging
ﬁrm is to increase its sales, thereby reducing the proﬁtability of a merger.
A ss h o w ni nS a l a n tet al. (1983), for the case of homogeneous products,
the eﬀect of the outsiders’ response may dominate so that a merger is
unproﬁtable. However, each outsider’s response is dampened if products
are diﬀerentiated. This explains why merger can be proﬁtable under
Cournot competition if products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated.8
8Note that the benchmark for our analysis is not a Salant et al. (1983) type
of model, where merger only leads to one ﬁrm disappearing, but a Lommerud and
Sørgard (1997) type of model where a merged ﬁrm is ’larger’ than other ﬁrms because
it now controls two brands. There is a close parallel to Baye, Crocker and Ju (1996).
6Irrespective of the nature of competition, the outsider will be a free
rider on the merger. It will experience higher prices and higher sales. It
will therefore gain more from the merger than the insiders, who experi-
ence a reduction in sales.
The upstream market
We model the upstream market in such a way that input suppliers
can be interpreted as either traditional proﬁt maximising ﬁrms, or as
trade unions that maximise union welfare. The most convenient way
is to model the input supplier as a trade union, and then treat the
proﬁt maximising ﬁrm as a special version of the utility maximising
trade union. For the moment then, let us consider the trade union. We
assume that wages are unilaterally set by monopoly unions.9 They are
characterised by identical Stone-Geary utility functions, given by
Ui =( wi − w)
θ (li)
1−θ (3)
where the parameter θ ∈ [0,1] captures the relative importance of wages
and employment to the unions.10 The reservation wage, w,i se q u a lt o
the wage that could be earned in the competitive sector of the economy.
For simplicity, w will be set equal to zero.
Now it is easily seen that, with w =0 ,ap r o ﬁt maximising input
supplier would be analogous to a union that maximises rents. Further,
setting θ =1 /2, we have a maximisation problem that is equivalent
to the one facing proﬁt maximizing upstream ﬁrms that are allowed to
set the prices of the input they deliver to downstream ﬁrms. When
θ → 0, this means that the upstream input suppliers only cares about
sales/employment. This approximates the situation one would get when
the input supplier is a price taker at a competitively given price.
The input supply structure is assumed to be exogenously given. From
Horn and Wolinsky (1988b) we know that if we allow the input supply
structure to be endogenously determined, the input suppliers will have
an incentive to form a single encompassing input supplier, as long as
products are substitutes in the output market. However, the observation
of great variation in input supply structure across diﬀerent countries -
for example trade union structure - indicates the importance of various
institutional determinants of the organisation of input suppliers.
In this model keeping a divisionalised structure, for example after a merger, plays
much the same role as keeping ’brands’ in our previous model.
9As pointed out by Dowrick (1989), this can be viewed as a limiting case of the
wage-bargaining union, where the union has all the bargaining strength.
10θ can be viewed as a measure of labour market distortion caused by unions.
When θ → 0 the wage approaches the competitive level. θ is assumed to be equal for
all unions.
7I nt h ep r e s e n tm o d e lw ea t t e m p tt oe x p l o r ei n p u tp r i c er e s p o n s e so f
downstream mergers, and the incentives for such mergers, under diﬀerent
exogenous input supply structures. Our main focus is directed towards
t h ec a s ew h i c hw eﬁnd most interesting, namely that of plant-speciﬁci n -
put supply, in which input suppliers are unable to coordinate their prices
across diﬀerent plants. This structure might be the natural one when
the input suppliers are upstream, proﬁt maximising ﬁrms, since there
are no institutional mechanisms implying that a downstream merger
should trigger a merger between input suppliers. In addition, in mar-
kets where ﬁrms are located in diﬀerent countries, there are obviously
both geographical and cultural obstacles to input supply cooperation. In
particular, whereas international mergers is a highly prevalent phenom-
enon among ﬁrms, we hardly ever observe a formal cooperation between
trade unions across borders.11 One main reason is probably that capital
is highly mobile between countries, whereas labour is generally not.
With domestic mergers, though, a natural modelling approach might
in some cases be to assume ﬁrm-speciﬁc input suppliers. For example,
trade unions are typically organised within a ﬁrm.12 Ad o w n s t r e a m
merger would then naturally lead to union merger as well. Moreover, it
turns out that the merged ﬁrms’ input suppliers are worse oﬀ following a
downstream merger. It is then natural also to investigate the case where
a downstream merger triggers an upstream merger, which is captured in
the model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc input suppliers.
Since a merger is a long term commitment, it is natural for the merger
candidates to anticipate the input suppliers’ response to a downstream
merger. In accordance with this, we let the merger decision be the stage
1 decision. Moreover, we would expect the input suppliers to antici-
pate how their price setting aﬀects the price setting in the downstream
market. Then we have the following sequence of moves:
Stage 1: Firm 1 and 2 decide whether or not to merge.
Stage 2: The input suppliers set input prices.
Stage 3: The downstream ﬁrms set quantities.
11In 1999, the share of all mergers and aquisitions, in terms of value, that was
cross-border reached nearly 31 per cent (UNCTAD, 2000).
12Unions are not ﬁrm-speciﬁc in all countries. In countries with very decentralised
bargaining structures, as the US and the UK (to the extent that these still are
unionised countries), this might perhaps best be represented as plant-speciﬁc union-
ism, especially when there is a substantial product diﬀerentiation among the divisions
in a merged entity. The recent strike at Boeing, following the merger with McDonnell
Douglas, can perhaps best be interpreted as a plant-speciﬁc union struggling, after a
merger, to avoid cut-backs in employment at precisely their own plant.
83P l a n t - s p e c i ﬁc input suppliers
With plant-speciﬁc input suppliers input prices are determined at plant
level. The decision of whether or not to merge, is assumed to be based
on a payoﬀ comparison with the no-merger benchmark equilibrium. In
the no-merger game, ﬁrm i chooses li to maximise
πi =( pi − wi)li (4)




In the post-merger game, the merged ﬁrm chooses l1 and l2 to maximise
πm =( p1 − w1)l1 +( p2 − w2)l2 (6)
where w1 is the input price set by the input supplier at plant 1, and w2 is
the input price set by the input supplier at plant 2. These input suppliers








Regarding the input price response to a merger, we have the following
result:13
Lemma 2. (i) w3 >w i if θ < 1
2 or b is suﬃciently low.
(ii) wi >w 1 = w2.
(iii) w3 >w 1 = w2.
The merging ﬁrms’ input prices fall, while the input price set by
the outsider’s input supplier will increase or decrease, depending on the
degree of product diﬀerentiation, and union preferences in the case of
trade unions. Importantly, though, the merged ﬁrm always faces lower
input prices than the outsider.
The input suppliers’ price setting on input is governed by the trade-
oﬀ between input prices and sales. Thus, a downstream merger will
lead to a change in input prices onl yi ft h en a t u r eo ft h i st r a d e - o ﬀ is
changed as a result of the merger. Providing that there are at least two
13All remaining proofs are presented in the appendix. Regarding notation, sub-
script i refers to the symmetric no-merger outcome, whereas all other subscripts refer
to the post-merger outcome.
9upstream ﬁrms in the industry, a downstream merger will change the
price elasticities of market shares for the input suppliers. The larger is
the share of total industry sales an input supplier will lose by increasing
the input price (i.e. the higher is the market share elasticity), the less
favourable is the trade-oﬀ between higher input prices and lower sales.
Consequently, the smaller is the incentive for the input supplier to push
for a higher input price.
The market share elasticities will change as a result of changes in the
rivalry (1) between downstream ﬁrms and (2) between upstream input
suppliers.
(1) Reduced product market competition
Consider a situation in which ﬁrm 1 and 2 buy their inputs from a
single input supplier, whereas a second input supplier is setting the input
price for sales to ﬁrm 3. Analysing a merger between ﬁrm 1 and 2 in
this situation would be one way to isolate the eﬀect of reduced product
market competition on the price setting on inputs.14
Comparing pre- and post-merger input prices for the merger partic-
ipants in this case, we ﬁnd that
∆w =
θ





2+2 b − θ
2b2¢ > 0 (9)
Hence, a reduction of product market competition leads to an increase
in input prices. This is in line with ﬁndings in related union-oligopoly
models, where input prices are wages (see e.g. Dowrick, 1989). Re-
duced product market competition means that the input suppliers’ mar-
ket shares get less elastic. In other words, the less competitive is the
product market, the smaller is the reduction in an input supplier’s share
of total industry sales resulting from a marginal increase in the price
level on inputs. Thus, a more concentrated downstream industry means
that the trade-oﬀ between higher input prices and lower sales is more
favourable for the input supplier, and the input supplier will optimally
set a higher input price. In addition, this eﬀect is reinforced by the
strategic complementarity of input prices.
The magnitude of the increase in input prices due to reduced prod-
uct market competition is highly dependent on the degree of product




14Reduced product market competition aﬀects price setting on inputs only to the
extent that it aﬀects market share elasticities for the input suppliers. Thus, there
must be some degree of competition between input suppliers for this eﬀect to be
present (cf. the case of industry-speciﬁc input suppliers in Section 4.2).
10Thus, a higher degree of substitutability in demand implies that the in-
crease in input prices from a reduction in product market competition
is larger. This is quite intuitive. If products are almost unrelated, mar-
ket shares are hardly aﬀected by the price setting on inputs and thus
play a very limited role for the optimal behaviour of input suppliers. As
products become closer substitutes, though, market shares become in-
creasingly sensitive to input price diﬀerentials, and changes in the degree
of product market competition have a greater inﬂuence on input price
setting.
(2) Increased competition between input suppliers
For the input suppliers of the merger participants, changes in market
share elasticities due to the merger is mainly caused by what we could
term a second-sourcing eﬀect. That is, when the merged ﬁrm is costlessly
able to shift production between its two plants the market shares of
the input suppliers belonging to the merged ﬁrm are highly dependent
on within-ﬁrm input price diﬀerentials, making the market shares more
elastic. This pulls in the direction of lower input prices. This eﬀect is
reinforced by the rivalry between the merged ﬁrm’s input suppliers.
One way to isolate the second-sourcing eﬀect is to ﬁx the input prices
of ﬁrm 2 and 3 at the pre-merger level (see (A.1) in the appendix) when
calculating the post-merger equilibrium. In this case input supplier 1
will set the input price15
w1 |w2,w3 fixed=
θ(2 + θb − 2b)
2+b − 2θb
(10)
C o m p a r i n g( 1 0 )a n d( A . 1 )w eﬁnd that the change in input prices due
to the second-sourcing eﬀect is given by
∆w1 =
−θb(1 − θ)
(2 + b − 2θb)
< 0
Furthermore, we also see that
∂(∆w1)
∂b < 0. Second-sourcing, created by
the merger, implies that the market shares of the merged ﬁrm’s input
suppliers become more elastic, causing the input suppliers to reduce
input prices. Since the relative market shares become more sensitive to
within-ﬁrm input price diﬀerentials when products are closer substitutes,
this eﬀect is increasing in b. In addition, this eﬀect is reinforced by the
competition between the input suppliers within the merged ﬁrm. This
15For suﬃciently high values of b we have a corner solution with all production
taking place at plant 1, but this is not important for the argument.
11eﬀect can be introduced by letting also w2 be determined endogenously
post-merger. In this case we ﬁnd that
w1 |w3 fixed=
2θ(4 + 3θb2 + b3 − θb3 − 2θb − b2 − 4b)
(2 + b − 2θb)(4+θb2 − b2 − 4θb)
(11)
Comparing (10) and (11) we ﬁnd that
∆w1 =
−θ
2b2 (4 − b)(1− θ)
(2 + b − 2θb)(4+θb2 − b2 − 4θb)
< 0
Since input prices are strategic complements, rivalry between the input
suppliers causes input prices to drop further. The strength of this eﬀect
is highly sensitive to the degree of product diﬀerentiation. From (11) we
see that w1,w 2 → 0 when b → 1. In the extreme case, when products
are homogeneous, input prices in the merged ﬁrm are competed down
to the reservation level.
For the outside ﬁrm, Lemma 2 shows that the merger has an ambigu-
ous eﬀect on input prices. This is due to two opposing forces governing
the outside input supplier’s price setting. On one hand, product market
competition is reduced, which points in the direction of higher input
prices, as we have seen above. On the other hand, since input prices are
strategic complements, an input price drop for the merged ﬁrm provides
the outside ﬁrm’s input supplier with an incentive to reduce input prices.
If products are suﬃciently close substitutes, the input price reduction
for the merged ﬁrm is suﬃciently large for the latter eﬀect to dominate,
resulting in lower input prices also for the outside ﬁrm (cf. Lemma 2).
Proposition 1. With plant-speciﬁc input suppliers, a merger is (i)
always proﬁtable for the participants unless b>0.55 and θ is close
to zero, and (ii) more proﬁtable for a participant than for the outsider
unless θ is very low.
We see from Proposition 1 that the results in the received literature
- referred to in Lemma 1 - is reproduced when θ approaches zero. As
already noted, in this case an input supplier (trade union) only cares
about sales (employment). Therefore a price (wage) close to the reser-
vation price (wage) results both before and after the merger. We are in
fact close to what the situation would have been with an input supplier
(trade union) without market power. In this case, a merger (in the limit)
has no eﬀect on input prices, and it is proﬁtable only if the products are
suﬃciently diﬀerentiated (b<0.55).
For the proﬁt maximising input suppliers that set input prices - the
case of θ =1 /2 - we see from the Proposition that a merger is always
12Figure 1: Merger proﬁtability with plant-speciﬁc input suppliers
proﬁtable for the merging ﬁrms and it is always more beneﬁcial to be an
insider than an outsider. Obviously, the driving force is the input price
changes reported in Lemma 1. The merging ﬁrm will face lower input
prices, and the merging ﬁrm’s input price is lower than the corresponding
input price for the outside ﬁrm.
If the input suppliers are trade unions, we see from the Proposition
that it matters whether they are employment-oriented or not. If an
input supplying ﬁrm is not a proﬁt maximiser, it matters correspondingly
how it weighs a higher price against lower sales. Here, we concentrate
on the trade union example. We ﬁnd the existence of a hump-shaped
relationship between θ and post-merger wage responses.16 This, in turn,
determines a similar relationship between θ and merger proﬁtability.
For low levels of θ, pre-merger input prices are close to the competitive
level, and there is not much room for wage reductions. As θ increases,
though, the larger is the wage reduction following a merger, increasing
the proﬁtability for the merger participants. However, for very high
values of θ, the unions have a strong preference for high wages, and even
though there are considerable room for wage reductions, a merger will
only trigger small adjustments in wages. Nevertheless, for values of θ
close to 1, even a marginal reduction in post-merger wages will make a
merger proﬁtable for the participants.
Product diﬀerentiation triggers two opposing forces in our model,
and the strength of these forces are determined by the degree of dif-
ferentiation. On the one hand, a lower degree of product diﬀerentiation
16This is quite natural. A change in wages takes place if a merger changes the
trade-oﬀ between wages and employment. This trade-oﬀ is of importance when both
wages and employment matter for the trade unions, which is especially the case
for medium values of θ. Equilibrium input prices and proﬁts are provided in the
appendix.
13Figure 2: Insider versus outsider proﬁtability of a merger when input
suppliers are plant-speciﬁc
makes the outsider’s aggressive response stronger, which tends to make a
merger less proﬁtable (cf. Lemma 1). On the other hand, if products are
close substitutes, the degree of competition between input suppliers is
ﬁerce, making a merger highly eﬀective as a disciplinary device towards
the input suppliers. From Proposition 1 it is apparent that these two
eﬀects tend towards cancelling each other out, making a merger prof-
itable for every degree of product diﬀerentiation, the exception being
when the input suppliers are trade unions with a very strong emphasis
on employment. As shown in Figure 1, a merger is proﬁtable even if
products are (almost) identical as long as θ is above a certain treshold
level.
From Lemma 2 we know that the input price reduction following
a merger is always larger in the merged ﬁrm than in the non-merged
ﬁrm. This helps explain the result illustrated in Figure 2. A merging
ﬁrm gains more from a merger than what is the case for the non-merged
ﬁr m .T h i si sa l w a y st r u ef o rt h ep r o ﬁt maximising input supplier, and
true for the case of trade unions as long as the unions are suﬃciently
wage-oriented. Furthermore, from Figure 2 we also see that if θ and b
are suﬃciently high, a downstream merger will actually harm the outside
ﬁrm, in terms of proﬁts.
4 Other types of input supply structures
As shown in the previous section, a downstream merger may lead to a re-
duction in upstream rents when input suppliers are plant-speciﬁc. This
illustrates that after a downstream merger the input suppliers would
have extra incentives to coordinate their input prices in order to reduce
the rivalry between them. One way to do so is for the merging down-
14stream ﬁrms’ input suppliers to merge.17 If so, the input suppliers are
ﬁrm- rather than plant-speciﬁc. In this section we contrast the outcome
derived in the previous section for plant-speciﬁc input suppliers with the
case with ﬁrm-speciﬁc input suppliers. In addition, we brieﬂy describe
the case with a single input supplier for the entire industry.
4.1 Firm-speciﬁc input suppliers
If input suppliers are organised at ﬁrm level, a merger between two or
more ﬁrms will implicitly lead to a higher degree of centralisation in input
price setting, since the merged ﬁrm only confronts one input supplier in
the post-merger game. In the second stage of the post-merger game, the
merged ﬁrm chooses l1 and l2 to maximise
πm =( p1 − wm)l1 +( p2 − wm)l2 (12)
where wm i st h ei n p u tp r i c es e tb yt h em e r g e dﬁrm’s input supplier,
which maximises
Um =( wm)
θ (l1 + l2)
1−θ (13)
Lemma 3. wm >w 3 >w i.
After the merger, equilibrium input prices increase for both the in-
siders and the outsider, but the merged ﬁrm faces a higher input price
than the outsider. Comparing with Lemma 2, the results are reversed
when we go from plant-speciﬁct oﬁrm-speciﬁc input suppliers.
The results in Lemma 3 follow straightforwardly from our discussion
of input price responses with plant-speciﬁc input suppliers. We noted
that a downstream merger aﬀects the rivalry both in the product market
and in the input supply market, and that in the case of plant-speciﬁc
input suppliers the two eﬀects work in opposite directions. In this case,
though, the two eﬀects pull in the same direction. A downstream merger
leads to less rivalry both in the product market and in the upstream
market, and both eﬀects tend to increase input prices.
After the merger, there is an asymmetry between the ﬁrms. The
merging ﬁrm oﬀers two brands while the non-merging ﬁrm oﬀers one
brand. For a uniform input price in the industry, this would imply that
the input price/sales ratio is lower for the merged ﬁrm’s input supplier.
It will then be optimal for the merged ﬁrm’s input supplier to set a price
in excess of the input price facing the outside ﬁrm. Consequently, the
17Collusion is another way this can be achieved, but this is not further pursued in
the present paper. For such an analysis within the context of a unionised international
duopoly, see Straume (2002).
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input price increase due to the merger is larger for the merged ﬁrm than
for the non-merged ﬁrm.
Implications for merger proﬁtability are stated in the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 2. With ﬁrm-speciﬁc input suppliers, a merger is (i)
proﬁtable for the participants only if b<0.55 and θ is close to zero, and
(ii) more proﬁtable for the outsider than for a participant.
I nF i g u r e3w eh a v es h o w nt h es e to fp a r a m e t e rv a l u e sf o rw h i c h
the merger is proﬁt a b l ef o rt h ep a r t i c i p a n t s . W es e et h a te x c e p tf o r
a few combinations of low θ and low b, a merger is unproﬁtable. It
suggests that if the input suppliers are proﬁt maximising ﬁrms, a merger
is never proﬁtable in the presence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc input suppliers. If the
input suppliers are trade unions, we have to impose extremely strong
assumptions regarding union preferences for a merger to be proﬁtable.
This is no surprise, given that a merger triggers a wage increase for
the merged ﬁrm and this wage increase is larger than the one in the
non-merged ﬁrm.
Comparing with Figure 1, we see the importance of the input supply
structure. While it is very likely that a merger is proﬁtable with plant-
speciﬁc input suppliers, it is highly unlikely that a corresponding merger
in an industry with ﬁrm-speciﬁc input suppliers is proﬁtable.
Note also from part (ii) of Proposition 2 that in this case it is better
being the outsider than being a participant in the merger. This is in
contrast to our results with plant-speciﬁc input suppliers. However, it
is in line with the results in the received literature. Since we know that
a merger with exogenous input prices is more proﬁtable for an outsider
than for an insider, it is obvious that this conclusion still holds when a
16merger results in a higher input price increase for the merged ﬁrm than
for the non-merged ﬁrm.
4.2 An industry-speciﬁc input supplier
If there are no obstacles to cooperation between the input suppliers, it
is obvious that the input suppliers could gain by coordinated behaviour.
If input suppliers are proﬁt maximising ﬁrms, anti-trust policy would
in many countries prevent the input suppliers from establishing a cartel
or to merge to a monopoly. If the input suppliers are trade unions, on
the other hand, there are in many countries no constraints on the coop-
eration between diﬀerent trade unions. If all the ﬁrms in the industry
recruit workers from an integrated labour market with a high degree of
worker mobility, we would reasonably expect the workers to be organised
in a single encompassing union (cf. Horn and Wolinsky, 1988b).
It is easily shown that, in this model, an industry-speciﬁc input sup-
plier will set the input price
w = θ (14)
regardless of the number of ﬁrms in the industry. Thus, a merger would
not aﬀect input prices at all. In Lommerud, Straume and Sørgard (2000)
we show that this result also holds for Bertrand competition.18
A central monopoly input supplier can drive an oligopoly from the
back-seat, so-to-speak. It controls the strategic interaction among ﬁrms
by having the ability to ﬁx the marginal production costs of all the
participants. By increasing input prices, product prices will have to
increase and sales will fall. A merger is irrelevant for input price setting
in this context, since it does not aﬀect the elasticity of labour demand.
5 An application: Domestic versus international
merger
A corollary of our model is that international mergers can be more prof-
itable than domestic mergers. This prediction can be explored in greater
detail by looking at a more speciﬁc set-up. Assume that, pre-merger,
ﬁrm 1 and 2 are located in a ’domestic’ country, whereas ﬁrm 3 is located
in a ’foreign’ country. To make things simple, we abstract from trade
18In fact, this result is more general, and does not hinge on the assumption of
linear demand. Under the assumption of constant elasticity of demand, Dowrick
(1989) shows that if the union is organised on an industry-wide basis, the wage is
independent of the degree of product market competitiveness, while Riley (1995)
shows that this result holds for a general demand function, i.e., the elasticity of
industry labour demand is independent of the degree of product market competition.
17costs and assume that the ﬁrms compete in a single market.19
In our setting, the diﬀerence between a domestic and an interna-
tional merger can be found in the changes it causes on the input supply
structure. Let us now interpret input suppliers as trade unions. In line
with our previous discussion we assume that a cross-border downstream
merger does not lead to a merger between the trade unions of the merg-
ing ﬁrms, whereas, in the case of a domestic downstream merger, this
will indeed be the case.
In order to make predictions about merger formation in this partic-
ular variant of our model, we will make use of an approach developed
by Horn and Persson (2001), which treats the merger process as a coop-
erative game of coalition-formation, where the players are free to com-
municate and write binding contracts. Using the terminology of Horn
and Persson, we let an ownership structure Mi be a partition of the set
N = {1,2,3} of owners (ﬁrms) into coalitions. Excluding the possibility
of complete monopolisation, there are three possible categories of market
structures, with a combined total of four diﬀerent ownership structures:
1. The decentralised structure (no merger): Mn = {1,2,3}
2. A domestic merger: Md = {(1 + 2),3}
3. A cross-border merger: Mc = {(1 + 3),2} and M0
c = {1,(2 + 3)}
Without going into details about the theoretical foundations, the
approach involves a comparison of any two possible ownership structures
Mi and Mj,w h e r eMi is said to dominate Mj (Mi dom Mj)i ft h e
combined proﬁts of the decisive group of owners are larger in Mi than in
Mj.T h e decisive group of owners are the owners that are expected to
be able to inﬂuence whether Mi will be formed instead of Mj,a n dv i c e
versa.
Which are the decisive owners? We do not allow payments between
coalition, so owners belonging to identical coalitions in the two struc-
tures cannot aﬀect whether Mj will be formed instead of Mi,b u ta l l
remaining owners can inﬂu e n c et h i sc h o i c ea n da r et h u sdecisive.I ft h e y
participate in a non-singleton coalition in Mj that does not exist in Mi,
this coalition requires the consent of all members of the coalition to be
formed. Alternatively, if they stand alone in Mj and thus lose partners
by moving from Mi to Mj, they can forgo surplus in Mi in order to
prevent Mj from being formed.20
Finally, the solution concept is the core. Those structures that are
in the core (i.e. the structures that are undominated)a r ed e ﬁned as
equilibrium ownership structures. Using this criterion, we are able to
state the following:
19This corresponds to the ’third-market’ model of Brander and Spencer (1985).
20See Horn and Persson (2001) for a formal deﬁnition of decisive owners.
18Proposition 3. The equilibrium market structure implies cross-
border merger, unless b>0.55 and θ is close to zero, for which the
equilibrium market structure implies no merger.
Given the previous results regarding the eﬀects of downstream merg-
ers on input prices, the intuition behind this result is quite intuitive.
In the model of endogenous merger formation that we use, mergers are
conducive to market structures with large industry proﬁts. In our model
such market structures are characterised by cross-border merger, since
this is a more eﬃcient way to reduce rents among the input suppliers.
6E x t e n s i o n s
Our basic model is rather stylised, so it is natural to check the robustness
of our results. Let us therefore explain how results may change when we
extend our basic model in two diﬀerent directions. For more details, see
Lommerud, Straume and Sørgard (2000).
Bertrand competition.W ek n o wf r o mt h el i t e r a t u r et h a ti fB e r t r a n d
competition prevails in a diﬀerentiated products industry, then a merger
with exogenous input prices is always proﬁtable. With plant-speciﬁc
input suppliers, we ﬁnd that this result is reinforced. More interestingly,
we ﬁnd that - as is the case with Cournot competition and endogenous
input prices - an insider can be better oﬀ than an outsider as a result
of a merger. If the input suppliers are ﬁrm-speciﬁc, though, a merger
can be unproﬁtable even in a setting with Bertrand competition. The
driving force is the input price increase following a merger. Hence, our
main results hold also in this extended version of our model. The reason
is that the change in input prices following a merger most of all depends
on the rivalry between the input suppliers, and the nature of this rivalry
- input prices being strategic complements - is independent of the nature
of competition in the product market.
Eﬃcient bargaining. In the basic model we have assumed that the
input suppliers unilaterally set the input price while the downstream
ﬁrm has complete discretion over sales decisions. In the case of trade
unions, this is a special case of the right-to-manage model. The union
and the ﬁrm bargain over the wage while the ﬁrm sets employment. In
the literature this model is often contrasted with the eﬃcient bargain-
ing model, where the union has the same relative bargaining strength
over wage setting as well as employment decisions (and possibly other
relevant decision variables). The existing literature suggests that the
bargaining game that will emerge as the equilibrium outcome depends
on the characteristics of the industry in question.21 It is then natural to
21Bughin (1999) ﬁnds that eﬃcient bargaining is the most likely equilibrium out-
19check whether our results still hold if we apply an eﬃcient bargaining
model rather than a monopoly union model. We have only investigated
t h ec a s eo fp l a n t - s p e c i ﬁc unions. It turns out that the qualitative results
depends on the relative bargaining strength of the players. However, we
ﬁnd that our main results are still valid. A merger can be proﬁtable
even in a Cournot setting without any exogenous ﬁxed costs savings,
and the insider may earn more from a merger than an outsider. The
intuition is that eﬃcient bargaining introduces two opposing forces. On
the one hand, the unions can extract a share of the potential proﬁti n -
crease following a merger. This tends to make a merger less proﬁtable
in a setting with eﬃcient bargaining. On the other hand, the merged
ﬁrm will have a better bargaining position since it can bargain with two
diﬀerent unions.22 The two opposing forces tend towards cancelling each
other out for a large set of parameter values.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have shown that the organisation of input suppliers is
decisive for input price responses to a downstream merger, and hence for
the proﬁtability of such a merger. While plant-speciﬁc input suppliers
tend to increase the proﬁtability of a merger and may even make it more
proﬁtable to take part in a merger than being an outsider, the results
are reversed in a setting with ﬁrm-speciﬁc input suppliers.
Our results suggest that ﬁrms considering to merge in an industry
with oligopolistic input suppliers should be concerned about how the
input suppliers respond to a possible merger. The existence of plant-
speciﬁc input suppliers is obviously an argument in favour of a merger,
from ﬁrms’ point of view. The reason is that a downstream merger would
trigger an increased degree of competition between the input suppliers
of the merging ﬁrms, thereby reducing the rent captured by the input
suppliers. However, the argument in favour of downstream merger is also
an argument in favour of merger among the input suppliers. By doing
so they can prevent the reduction in their own rent. The plant-speciﬁc
input suppliers are then not plant-speciﬁca f t e rt h em e r g e r ,b u ti n s t e a d
de facto ﬁrm-speciﬁc input suppliers. The downstream ﬁrms should
anticipate such an outcome. We extend our model to an endogenous
merger formation model to take this into account. We show that the
equilibrium market structure might be cross-border merger. The rea-
come, even more so under the threat of entry. Petrakis and Vlassis (2000) ﬁnds
that right-to-manage bargaining is the equilibrium outcome if the unions’ bargain-
ing power is suﬃciently high, while Espinosa and Rhee (1989) ﬁnd that eﬃcient
bargaining may emerge as an equilibrium outcome in inﬁnitely repeated games.
22See also Davidson (1988).
20son is that merger between input suppliers is less likely in cross-border
mergers. If so, the downstream ﬁrms merge across borders to reduce the
rent extracted by the input suppliers.
Finally, we think our results could guide future empirical research
on the wage eﬀects of mergers. The results in the received empirical
literature are mixed. Some ﬁnd support for a wage increase following
a merger, some for a wage cut, while others ﬁnd no eﬀect at all.23 If
one in the same data material combines mergers with plant-speciﬁca n d
ﬁrm-speciﬁc unions, one might ﬁn dt h a tm e r g e r sh a v e-i fa n y-o n l ya
limited eﬀect on wages. According to our results the underlying truth
could be that some mergers result in wage drops while others give wage
rises. A proper empirical test should then start with a detailed study of
the union structure which, in turn, should lead to a discrimination in the
data material between industries with plant- and ﬁrm-speciﬁc unions.
Appendix: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Solving the no-merger game by backwards induction, we ﬁnd that
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I nt h ec a s eo fplant-speciﬁc input suppliers, input prices and proﬁts
in the asymmetric post-merger Nash equilibrium are given by
w1 = w2 =
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23Cremieux et al. (1996) and Peoples et al. (1993) ﬁnd support for a wage cut
following a merger, while McGuckin et al. (1995) ﬁnd the opposite result. Hekmat
(1995) ﬁnd no evidence of any link between mergers and wages, while Gokhale et al.
(1993) ﬁnd no or only limited evidence of a link between takeovers and wages.
21where









I nt h ec a s eo fﬁrm-speciﬁc input suppliers, input prices and proﬁts
in the asymmetric post-merger Nash equilibrium are given by
wm =
θ(2 + b + θb − b2)
2+2 b − θ
2b2 (A.7)
w3 =
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Proof of Lemma 2. (i) From (A.1) and (A.4), w3 >w i if
θb2 (1 − θ)(4− 4θ − 4θb +2 θb2 − b2)
η(2 + b − 2θb)
> 0.
The denominator is obviously positive for θ,b ∈ h0,1i.T h e n u m e r -
ator is positive if (4 − 4θ − 4θb +2 θb2 − b2) > 0. Rearranging yields
4(1− θ(1 + b)) + b2 (2θ − 1) > 0. We see that this condition holds if
θ < 1
2 or if b is suﬃciently low.
(ii) From (A.1) and (A.3), wi >w 1 = w2 reduces to
θb(1 − θ)(4+4b − b2 − b3 − 2θb2 (1 − b))
(2 + b − 2θb)η
> 0.
which holds for θ,b∈ h0,1i.
(iii) From (A.3) and (A.4), w3 >w 1 = w2 reduces to
θb(2b +1 )( 2− b)(1− θ)
η
> 0
w h i c hi st r u ef o rθ,b∈ h0,1i. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1. (i)Am e r g e ri sp r o ﬁtable if πm−2πi > 0.
From Lemma 1 we know that this is true if θ =0and b<0.55. From
Lemma 2 it must be the case that this is also true for b<0.55 and θ > 0.
22For b>0.55 we know (from Lemma 1) that πm−2πi < 0 if θ =0 .S e t t i n g
b =1 , we can from (A.2) and (A.5) ﬁnd that πm − 2πi > 0 if:
−9 + 138θ − 127θ
2 +8 θ
3(1 + θ)
72(2θ − 3)2 > 0.
This condition is met if θ > 0.07. Then we know that for θ ∈ h0,1i
and b ∈ h0.55,1i there are critical values where πm =2 πi.I nF i g u r e3
(section 3) we have plotted the curve where πm =2 πi in a (θ,b)-diagram,
using the expressions in (A.2) and (A.5). It follows immediately that
πm > 2πi above the curve.
(ii) A participant earns πm/2 and the non-merging ﬁrm π3 in the
post-merger equilibrium. We know from Lemma 1 that for θ =0 ,t h e n
πm−2π3 < 0.S e t t i n gb =1and using the expressions reported in (A.2)
and (A.6), we have that πm − 2π3 < 0 if 20θ − 7θ
2 > 4.T h i sc o n d i t i o n
is met if θ < 0.21. Then we know that for θ,b∈ h0,1i there are critical
values where πm − 2π3 =0 . In Figure 4 (section 3) we have plotted the
curve where πm =2 π3 in a (θ,b)-diagram, using the expressions in (A.2)
and (A.6). Obviously, πm > 2π3 a b o v et h ec u r v e.¥
Proof of Lemma 3. From (A.1), (A.7) and (A.8), and after rear-
ranging, wm >w 3 reduces to
θb(1 − b)(1− θ)
¡
2+2 b − θ
2b2¢ > 0
whereas w3 >w i reduces to
θb2 (1 − θ)(2+2θ − θb)
¡
2+2 b − θ
2b2¢
(2 + b − 2θb)
> 0
It can easily be seen that both inequalities hold for b,θ ∈ h0,1i. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .(i)W ek n o wf r o mL e m m a1t h a ti fθ =0 ,
then πm > (<)2πi if b<(>)0.55.F r o mL e m m a3i tm u s ta l s ob et h e
case that πm < 2πi if b>0.55 and θ > 0. Then we know that there
are combinations of θ ∈ h0,1i and b ∈ h0,0.55i such that πm =2 πi.B y
using the expressions in (A.2) and (A.9), we ﬁnd these combinations of
θ and b. They are plotted in a (θ,b)-diagram in Figure 5 (section 4.1).
Obviously, above the curve shown in Figure 5 πm < 2πi.
(ii) We know from Lemma 1 that for exogenous input prices, πm <
2π3. Given the result in Lemma 3, it is trivial to see that the result in
Lemma 1 applies in this case too. ¥
23P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . When comparing Md and Mn,t h ed e -
cisive group of owners consists of the merger participants in Md.T h e
comparison of equilibrium payoﬀsi nt h i sc a s ec o i n c i d e sw i t ht h ec a s eo f
ﬁrm-speciﬁc input suppliers in Section 4.1. Let πi (Mj) be the equilib-
rium proﬁts of ﬁrm i in ownership structure Mj. From Proposition 2
we know that πm(Md) > 2πi (Mn), implying Md dom Mn,i fb<0.55
and θ is close to zero. For other parameter values, the dominance re-
lation is reversed. Likewise, when comparing Mc and Mn, the decisive
owners are the merger participants in Mc. This coincides with the case
of plant-speciﬁc input suppliers in Section 3, and from Proposition 1 we
know that πm (Mc) > 2πi (Mn), implying Mc dom Mn, unless b>0.55
and θ is close to zero. For this (small) set of parameter values, the dom-
inance relation is reversed. Finally, when comparing Mc and Md,a l l
three owners are decisive. In this case we have to compare total indus-
try proﬁts in the two diﬀerent market structures. This corresponds to a
comparison of post-merger industry proﬁts for the case of plant-speciﬁc
and ﬁrm-speciﬁc input suppliers, respectively. Using (A.5), (A.6), (A.9)
and (A.10) in the appendix, we ﬁnd that
P3
i=1 πi (Mc) >
P3
i=1 πi (Md),
implying Mc dom Md, for the entire set of parameter values. Hence, Mc
is undominated unless b>0.55 and θ is close to zero, for which Mn is
undominated. ¥
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